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ANNA K. PHYLE, Appellant, v. CLINTON T. DUFFY, _ 
. Warden of the State Prison, etc., Respondent. . 
(1] 0rimIDal Law-J'uclgment--BncutiOD of Death 8eDteDce-
8aDitJ JnveatlgatioD.-The Supreme Court afBrmed a judg-
ment denying a petition for writ of mandate to eompel the 
warden of the atate prison to institute a prooeeding under 
Pen. Code, 13701, for a jury determination of the aanity of 
a prisoner who had previously been adjudged inaane bya jury 
and couunitted to a atate hospital following a death •• Dtenoe, 
and who, on a certification by the auperintendent of aueb 11 .... 
pitaJ that he was laDe, was returned to prison for UeeutiOD, 
where, regardJess of whether l"..&Ddamus was an appropriate 
remedy, the prisoner was aocorded a full hearing on the iaaue of 
his aanity at that time, and the evidence aupporied a determina-
tion that the warden then had no "pod reaacm" to believe 
that the prisoner had become or was iDaane. 
(1] See 8 Oal.Jur. 845 . 
. J[c][. Die. JLeference: [1] Criminal I. ... , 1104S. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin 
County. Arthur Coats, Judge.- AtUrmed. 
Proeeeding in mandamus to compel warden of state prison to 
institute proceeding for determination of sanity of a prisoner 
under sentenee of death. Judgment denying writ, afIlnned. 
Morris Lavine for Appellant. 
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Clarence A. Lbm, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-William Jerome Phyle'. convietion of 
murder and sentence to. death was reviewed andafllnned 
upon appeal. (People v. PArle, 28 Cal.2d 671 [171 P.2d 
428J.) In December, 1946, two days prior to the time 
set for his exeeution, the warden of San Quentin Prison, 
as authorized by section 3701 of the Penal Code, stated 
to the District Attorney of Marin County that there was 
"good reason to believe" Phyle was insane. In a pro-
ceeding to determine that question, a jury adjudged Phyle 
to be insane, and he was eommitted to the state hospital. Less 
than one month later, the superintendent of the hospital cer-
tified to the Governor that Phyle had recovered his sanity. 
He was returned to prison and the. execution was set for the 
following May. 
Shortly before that time, a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus was filed with this court. The writ issued and the 
execution was stayed. Subsequently the writ was dismissed 
and Phyle was remanded to custody for the execution of the 
sentence of death. (30 Cal.2d 838 [186 P.2d 134].) Apeti-
tion for rehearing was filed, and denied. March, 1948, was 
then fixed for execution. Again, a new legal proceeding was 
commenced and Phyle's petition to the United States Supreme 
Court for certiorari and stay of execution was granted. Upon 
the further consideration of the matter, the writ of certiorari 
was dismissed. (334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ot. 1131, 92 L.Ed. 1494J.) 
A third date, September, 1948, was then fixed for the execu-
tion of Phyle, but a few days before that time, Phyle'. mother, . 
on his behalf, filed in the superior court a petition for a writ 
of mandate to compel the warden to institute a proceeding 
-.Aasiped by Chairman of .Tudieial Couacil. 
) 
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for the determination of his sanity by a jury in accordance 
with thc provisions of section 3701 of the Penal Code. An 
alternative writ was u;'o;uf·d and a stny of execution gr:mtt'd. 
Upon a trial, the court found that there was no reason to 
believe Phyle was insane. The alternative writ was discharged. 
and the stay of execution was neated. 
The present appeal is from that judgment. Prior to the 
iiling of any briefs, the attorney general moved for the fol· 
lowing relief in the alternative: (1) To dismiss the appt'ilJ 
as frivolous and taken soleJy for dt'lay; (2) To affirm 'he 
judgmt'nt; (3) To advance the cause on the calendar aud 
submit the same for deeision; or (4) For such other relif'f 
as may be proper. Following tht' argumt'nt upon the motion, 
the appeal was advanced fnr hf'aring on the merits. 
[1] As grounds for reVf'rsaJ of the judgment. Pbyle 8S-
serts: (1) that since he wa~ declart'd insane by the verdict of 
B jnry, he is presumed to be insallf' until II jury finds to the 
contrary; (2) section 3704, if constitutionally construed. gives 
him aright to a trial by jury on that question; (3) the failure 
to grant a jury trial in the prt'sent procet'ding was a violation 
of due process under the Fedt'ral Constitution: (4) any pro-
cedure denying a full judicial hearing. as providt'd by the 
laws of the State of California is 8 denial of duf' process 
under the guarantee of the Federal Constitution: and (5) 
section 3704 of the Penal Code is constitutional only if eon· 
strued as requiring a trial by jury upon the issue of reNtora· 
tion to sanity. In substance, Phyit"s position is that both 
under California law and the requirements of federal rlne I 
process, he is entitled to a trial by jury to determine whether 
he has been restored to sanity. 
After section 3704 of the Penal Code was construf'd by this 
eourt adversely to Phyle in the habeas corpll~ prof'eerlin~ 
(1n re Phyle, 30 CaL2d 838 [186 P.2d 1341 I, the Snrrprne 
Court of the United States granteii a writ of f'ertiorarl "bt>-
cause of the serious nature of the due process eontt'ntionR 
presented in the petition. It The questions presented. as statl'd 
by the court, were .. that eXt'l'ution of an insanf' man it: (If. 
fensive to the fundamt'ntal prinl'iples of life and justice which 
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. Adam-
Bon v. California, 322 U.S. 46 l67 s.Ct. 1672. 91 L.Ed. 1903, 
171 A.L.R. 12231. Carter v. llli1lots. 329 U.S. 173 f67 S.Ct. 
216. 91 L.Ed 172]. and .. that liff' shall not be taken by 
th~ state as the result of the uureviewable ex parte determina-
/ 
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tion of a cruciaJ fact made by a single executive officer. See 
Ng Fung Ho v. White,259 U.S. 276 [42 8.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 
938]. " But the jurisdiction to determine these issues was 
expressly limited as follows: "It is not appropriate for us 
to pass on such constitutional questions in this habeas corpuS 
case if, as the California attorney genera] contends, there is 
a state remedy by mandamus available to petitioner under 
which he can invoke judicial action to compel the warden to 
initiate judicial proceedings, and in which mandamus pro-
ceedings the court will hear and consider evidence to deter-
mine whether there is 'reason to believe' that the petitioner 
is insane. " 
After an analysis of the California statutes and decisions, 
the writ of certiorari was dismissed with a reference to In re 
Phyle, supra, which it was said, held "that neither habeas 
corpus nor any other remedy is available to test sanity of a 
condemned defendant, except the remedy under section 8701 
which only the warden can institute. Hence, 80 far as here 
appears, mandamus to compel action by the warden is the 
only available remedy." And the court concluded: " We 
cannot say at this time that California's remedy by mandamus 
will be less than a substantial equivalent of one which author-
ized him to apply directly to a court for fun hearing ' ..• 
[and] in this situation we find no federal constitutional ques-
tion presented which is ripe for decision here." Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter's concurring opinion likewise viewed the situa-
tion as one of local procedure: "The Court now finds that 
all that the California Supreme Court did was to hold that 
as a matter of California procedure the petitioner's claim 
could not be passed on by the direct remedy of habeas corpus, 
but that there is available a special local remedy, labeled 
mandamus, whereby the petitioner can judiciaUy fest his pres-
ent sanity." (Emphasis added.) Otherwise stated, certiorari 
was granted because Phyle claimed he was to be executed after 
a determination as to his sanity by a hospital superintendent 
with no further proceeding open to him, and the court dis-
missed the writ when it appeared that there is a way whereby 
"ne in his position may continue to press the right to prove 
present insanity and obtain a judicial determination of the 
question. 
As indicated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it 
is clear that the claim which must be subject to judicial 
review is "present sanity"; it is presently that Phyle is to 
) 
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be executed, and it is only his threatened execution whi • 
could compel a judicial hearing. ;~~ 
However, Phyle's counsel insists that the Supreme Cou-
by its opinion, has directed this court to review the determi 
nation by the hospital superintendent, which was the questio' 
decided in the habeas corpus appeal. The argument whoU, 
ignores the issues here involved. In neither opinion in , 
Supreme Court is there any holding or implication that Phyl 
is entitled to a trial by jury 88 a matter of right for th', 
purpose of reviewing the finding of the hospital superintend 
ent concerning restoration to sanity. In the ease of In ' 
Phyle, 80 Cal.2d 838 [186 P.2d 134], this court determine<t 
that the law of California does not give one a right to su~ 
a review, and the United States Supreme Court, in analyzing 
itS decision in Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 898 [18 S.Ct. 87, 
42 L.Ed. '515], rejected the argument that there is a right 
a trial by jury under such circumstances. It said: "A con~ 
demned defendant cannot automatically block execution by, 
suggestions of insanity, and . . . a state tribunal, particularly" 
a judge, must be left free to exercise a reasonable discretion, 
in determining whether the facts warrant a full inquiry and 
hearing upon the sanity of a person sentenced to death." 
Assuming, therefore, that due process of law requires .' 
judicial hearing upon the issue of present sanity of a person' 
condemned to execution, this proceeding in mandate accords ~ 
Phyle such hearing. By it, he has been given a judicial deter-
mination upon the only issue he could properly raise, and it, 
is significant that the judgment is not challenged upon the 
ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to suPPort it. 
In addition to the points presented in the brief, at the oral, 
argument counsel for Phyle argued that the law of California . 
requires a trial by jury in a proceeding brought to compel '. 
the warden to initiate a hearing on the issue of a prisoner'.' 
sanity in accordance with the provisions of section 8701 of 
the Penal Code. Section 7 of article I of the California Con- " 
stitution provides; "The right to trial by jury shall be 
lIecured to all. and remain inviolate." That right. however. 
is only such as existed at common law. (Pomeroy v. CollIns, 
J98 Cal. 46 1243 P. 657] ; People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348 f25 
P. 481, 11 L.R.A. 75]: People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal.App.2d 
75 140 P.2d 8911; Estate of Escover, 108 CalApp. 697 [292 
P. 1671; Gregory v. Heeke. 73 Cal.App. 268 (238 P 7871.) 
It has always been held in this state that the right of jU1'1 ;1 
'1 
;'< 
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tria] does not extend to special proceedings (V aUejo elc. B.B. 
Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545 (147 P. 238]), and 
mandate, being a special proceeding, is not subject to the 
constitutional requirement (Hutchison v. Reclamation District 
No. 1619, 81 Cal.App. 427 [254 P. 606]), although the Legis-
lature bas provided that, where the answer raises a question 
of fact as to an essential matter, "the court may, in its dis-
cretion, order the question to be tried before a jury." (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1090.) 
In the present case, Phyle did not request the eourt to 
submit any issue raised by the petition to a jury, nor, bad 
such request been made, would it have compelled an affirma-
tive ruling because a trial by jury of issues of fact in a man-
date proceeding is wholly within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge. Instead of making such a request, Phyle's counsel 
placed themselves in the rather anomalous position of peti-
tioning for a writ of mandate and then demanding that the 
writ issue asa matter of right without otfering any evidence 
whatever. 
At the outset of the trial, counsel for Phyle said, "I might: 
state our position. I do not wish to otfer any evidence at this . 
time. I do not think it is the proper time to otfer evidence." 
After a discussion of the opinion in the prior proceedings 
brought by Phyle, the trial judge asked: .. Are you going to 
submit any evidence or is this argument' As I understand it 
at the present time on this petition for mandate, all you are 
asking is that the Warden of the State Prison certify that he 
believes the defendant to be insane." Following counsel's 
affirmative reply, the court continued: "Therefore, as ..• 
he has refused to certify, we can take evidence to determine 
whether or not there is reasonable ground for the Warden's 
opinion, that is as far as this writ is concerned. If you wish 
to present evidence, you may." This otfer was declined by 
counsel who stated: "I don't believe any evidence is neces-
sary your honor." 
But the attorney general insisted upon the presentation of 
evidence. He said: "If your Honor please, because of the 
gravity of the matter, before I would be wilJing to close the I 
book on it, I would want the Warden to take the stand and, 
have him give the reasons that impel him to the conclusion I 
that he has reached." Counsel for Phyle again stated bis 
position that the issue before thE' court for decision was one! 
of law: "I think what is before this Court [apparently refer~ 
I 
-
I 
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ring to the prior judgment declaring Phyle insane which w .. ; 
mentioned but never offered in evidence] is res adjudicata aa:~ 
to the question of insanity-eertainly at that time." It ia~ 
clear, therefore, that counsel was acting on the assumption, 
that by this proceeding in mandate, the question as to Phyle ~ 
insanity as of December, 1945, and January, 1946, was being 
opened up, and throughout the entire mandate proceedings, he, 
refused to meet the issue of present sanity as the subject of, 
inquiry. .~. 
Although there was no evidence offered by Phyle to support . 
the petition for the writ, the court heard witnesses called by, 
the attorney general and cross-examined by counsel for peti-; 
tioner. Finally, two witnesses testified for Phyle. Ther~fore,' 
notwithstanding the theory followed by petitioner's counsel •• ' 
full and fair hearing was held upon the issue of Phyle's sanity· ' 
at that time. 
The record has been examined and discloses that the find- : 
ings of the trial court are fully supported by the evidence. 
Warden Duffy appeared as a witness and testified that he had 
visited Phyle on a number of occasions; it was his opinion 
that Phyle was presently sane, and there was no reason he 
knew of to believe that Phyle was insane. This conclusion, he 
stated, he reached upon the basis not only of his personal 
. observation, but also from reports from six different psychia-
trists, all of whom had examined Phyle and found him sane. 
Two of these six psychiatrists were called as expert witnesses 
by respondent, and each testified that, in his opinion, Phyle 
was sane. They both reported that Phyle knew he was in San 
Quentin convicted of the murder of Frazee, knew he was under 
judgment of death, knew that his execution had been stayed 
by the mandate proceeding, was conversant with the facts of 
his original trial, and was not suffering from any hallucina-
tions or delusions. . 
One of these experts was Dr. Walter Rappaport, the hos-
pital superintendent who issued the certificate of restoration 
to sanity after the judgment entered upon the verdict of a 
jury to the contrary. Upon cross-examination, Dr. Rappaport 
explained that shortly after Phyle's commitment to the hos-
pital, he "told me very frankly he had faked the whole thing 
and he was surprised that Dr. Schmidt [the prison psychia-
trist] was fooled but not surprised that he fooled the warden. 
. . . He said other prisoners conducted examinations and that 
naturally if they are friendly and want to help you they would 
"- . 
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indicate to you what you should say and what the &n8Wer 
should be. He was very frank." 
At this point, counsel for petitioner called Dr. David G. 
Schmidt, the prison psychiatrist, who testified that, although 
at one time he had been convinced that Phyle was insane, he 
was presently certain of Phyle's sanity. This testimony was 
unshaken in spite of severe cross-examination. 
Mrs. Anna Phyle, the petitioner and mother of Phyle, then 
testified. The most direct testimony she gave was that, after 
his return from the war, her son acted queerly and she 
4'couldn't figure him out •.. he was almost violent [and ahe] 
was really afraid of him." She then stated that "he was 
improved some but when he 'left and committed this enms, he 
was not in his right mind, he was mentally sick." (Emphasis 
added.) Such testimony falls far short of a compelling reason 
for a conclusion of present insanity. 
The record, therefore, fully supports the determination that 
the warden "does not have, nor is there any good reason to 
believe that said William Jerome Phyle has become· insane 
or is presently insane." In such circumstances, the trial judge 
could not have done other than discharge the alternative writ. 
Whatever may have been Phyle's mental condition at other 
times, the legislative concern expressed in section 1367 of the 
Penal Code is that the state shall not execute a person who 
is insane. The United States Supreme Court indicated that 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
• hearing upon that question when it is properly presented 
for consideration. Phyle was afforded the opportunity to 
•• judicially test his present sanity" and no legal ground has 
been shown for disturbing the finding adverse to him. 
In order that there be no misunderstanding as to the scope 
of this holding (see Young v. Ragen, 334 U.S. 810 [68 S.Ct. 
1013, 92 L.Ed. 1742], following Lofttu v. Illinois, 334 U.S. 
804 [68 S.Ot. 1212, 92 L.Ed. 1737]), the law of California, 
as it has heretofore been stated, is as follows: The ease of 
In re Phyle, 30 Cal.2d 838 [186 P.2d 134], held that "there 
is no authority ... for the proposition that [a condemnt'd] 
defendant has a right to habeas corpus or other judicial pro-
ceeding to determine the question of his sanity after bis 
release from the state hospital." The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, hut later dismissed the writ upon 
procedural grounds intimating that due process of law re-
quires some sort of judicial hearing upon the issue of the 
.~ .. 
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-present sanlty of a person uuder sentence of death. (PAyle~' 
Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ct. 1181,92 L.Ed. 1494].) Becaue 
of the insistence of the attorney general that mandate is aU 
available remedy. the court found "no federal constitutional 
.question ripe for decision." Otherwise stated, until Phyle" 
,jinally and unequivocally denied a judicial hearing in an:i 
form, a determination as to whether there is a constitutional 
right to such a bearing would be premature. 
After that case was decided, the claim of insanity made 011 
.behalf of one Eggers, then under sentence of death, came l4) 
this court by·.all appeal from a denial of • writ of manda~~' 
,by the trial court. The remedy of mandate was utilized..,. 
compel the warden to bring Eggers before a jury for a deter'} 
,mination as to his sanity under tht' procedure specified by. 
section 3701 of the Penal Code. The judgment denying the 
writ was affirmed (Williatnl v. Duffy, 82 Cal.2d 578 [197 P.2d: 
341 J) but without any express determination that mandate-
is an available remedy. Certain statements made in deciding' 
Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 8.Ot. 1131, 92 L.Ed. 1494],; 
seemed to indicate that there was some question as to the . 
soundness of the conclusion of this court in the first Phyle 
case (lft.re PAlIZe, 30 Cal.2d 838 [186 P.2d 134]). Because of 
this uncertain situation, tllis court, in deciding Williams v. 
Duffy, fttpra, 88$umed the necessity of the remedy and con-
eluded, upon the merits, that the evidence was insufficient to ' 
show any good reason to believe Eggers was insane. The deci-, 
mon in the present case has the same basis, for the record 
includes no evidence tending to show any reasonable founda-
tion for a belief that PhyJe is insane. 
If, therefore, it is assumed that due process of law requires 
.. judicial inquiry concerning the .issue as to aanity, neees-
fJarily the conclusion reached in the decision of 1ft. re PAyle, 
"pra, is incorrect, and the question for determination here 
would concern the remedy or remedies available to a person 
in Phyle's r.osition. In turn, the particular relief sought by 
Phyle would be the decisive factor. 
The normal method of reviewing the legality of a prisoner'. 
detention is by writ of habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, § 1473; 
1ft. re BeZl, 19 Ca1.2d 488 (122 P.2d 22] j 13 Cal.Jur. 216 j 
cf. Loftus v. IUift.Dis, 334 U.S. 804 [68 S.Ot. 1212, 92 L.Ed. 
1737]), and where habeas corpus is available and adequate 
it is the exclusive remedy and mandate will be denied. (Irvine 
v. Gib.~on, 1~ Cal.2d 14 [118 P.2d 812J; Boss v. O'Brien, 
1 Cal.App. 2:.1496 [36 P.2d 1108J.) Certainly, in the absence 
) 
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of a particular statutory remedy, the procedure of habeas 
corpus would satisfy any assumed requirement of judicial 
hearing upon the issue of the present sanity of a condemned 
prisoner. 
However, section 8701 of the Penal Code provides that 
where there is good reason to believe a condemned priSoner is 
insane the warden mtuf institute a proceeding directed to 
obtaining a jury trial of the issue of his sanity. Due process 
does not require such a trial. (PhyZe v. Duffy, 834 U.S. 431 
[68 s.Ot. 1131, 92 L.Ed. 1494] ; Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 
398 [18 S.Ot. 87,42 L.Ed. 515].) Its basis is entirely statutory, 
and the determination by a jury may be obtained only when 
the proceeding is instituted by the warden. Mandate is the 
proper remedy to compel a public officer to perform an official 
duty, and it may be had not only upon a failure to exercise 
a duty but also wherc the officer's refusal to do so constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. (McClatchy Newspapers v. 8uperior 
Court,26 Cal.2d 386, 394 [159 P.2d 944].) 
Where a prisoner seeks to invoke the statutory remedy 
provided by section 3701 of the Penal Code, mandate is the 
only available proceeding. Thus, upon the assumption that 
any judicial hearing as to sanity must be afforded one under 
sentence of death, there are two remedies, each directed to an 
exclusive form of relief. To acquire a simple judicial deter-
mination of the fact of sanity, habeas corpus is the proper 
and exclusive remedy. But to obtain a jury trial of that issue, 
as provided by section 8701 of the Penal Code, mandate is the 
only available and adequate remedy. As stated by Mr. Justice 
Black: ccIn view of this mandatory obligation [under Pen. 
Code, § 8701] upon the warden to initiate proceedings if 
'there is good reason to believe' a defendant sentenced to 
death is insane, it would be somewhat anomalous, to say the 
least, if California courts were wholly without power to cor-
rect an executive agent's abuse of authority in a matter of 
such significance as the execution of insane persons." (Phllle 
v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ot.1131, 1135-36, 92 L.Ed.1494].) 
Throughout the habeas corpus proceedings and the one 
now under review, Phyle has sought only a jury trial. To 
ohtain such relief, his proper remedy, if any is available, is 
the proceeding for mandate here under review. But upon the 
application for the writ itself he is not entitled to a trial by 
jury; only when he has obtained the writ may he have such 
a trial, and having failed to show any "good reason" why 
I 
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the warden should initiate an inquiry, the judgment denying 
the remedy allowed by section 3701 of the Penal Code must 
be affirmed. • 
It is so ordered. 
Gibson, O. J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
TRA YNOR, J .-1 concur in the judgment. 
Petitioner contends. that under the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Phyle v. Dully, 334 U.S. 431 168 
S.Ot. 1131,92 L.Ed. 1494], he is entitled to the judicial bear-. 
ing that this court bas denied him.:. 
Neither that decision nor any provision of the United States 
Constitution gives petitioner the right to an initial judicial. 
determination of his restoration to sanity or to a judicial re-
view of an administrative determination thereof. The statutes 
of this state, as construed in In r. Ph.yl., 300al.2d 838 1186 
P.2d 134], preclude both a judicial hearing and judicial re-
view. This court there held that in Penal Code, sections 3700-
3704, the Legislature bas prescribed the exclusive method by 
which the sanity or the restoration to sanity of one condemned 
to death who subsequently becomes insane may be determined. 
Penal Code, section 3704, provides that" {w]hen the defend-
ant recovers bis reason, the superintendent of such hospital 
must certify that fact to the Governor, who must thereupon 
issue to the warden his warrant appointing a day for the execu-
tion of the judgment. . . ." The court held that the deter. '. 
mination by the hospital superintendent prescribed by the 
statute was not subject to judicial review by habeas corpus 
or otherwise. It invoked the provision of Penal Code, section 
3700, that "No judge, court, or officer, other than the Gov-
ernor, can suspend the execution of a judgment of death, 
except the warden of thf' State prison to whom he is delivered 
for execution . . . unless an appeal is taken." Petitioner 'a 
appeal had previously been determined (28 Cal.2d 671 [171 
P.2d 428]) and his conviction had become final. A judicial 
~view of the hospital superintendent's determination would 
compel suspension of the execution of the judgment, contrary 
to the express terms of section 3700. 
Gardn.r v. JOMS, 126 Oal. 614 [59 P. 126], and In r. 
Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330 [61 P. 1120, 50 L.R.A. 378], are not 
applicable here. Those cases determined that a person held 
in a state hospital as insane could properly bring habeas 
corpus to compel the superintendent to release him as cured; 
/ 
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habeas corpus always lies at the petition of one unlawfully 
restrained of his liberty. (Pen. Code, § 1473.) They are not 
authority for the converse proposition that a person found 
sane and released from a hospital may maintain an action 
of habeas corpus to prove himself insane and thus gain re-
admission to the hospital. Petitioner was released from the 
state hospital because he was found sane. He would have gone 
free had he not been detained by respondent by virtue of a 
final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. (Pen. 
Code, § 1486[2].) He would have gone free had he not been 
convicted of murder, and there can be no doubt that he could 
not invoke habeas corpus to return to the hospital. He cannot 
invoke it now to escape the execution of the judgment. The 
intervention of the judgment has no bearing on the question 
of his sanity; it does not give him a right to habeas corpus 
to get back into the hospital that he otherwise would not have. 
Petitioner contended that the California procedure as thus 
interpreted would deprive him of his life without due process 
of law, and on that ground he petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The court granted 
the petition to determine whether there was any merit in this 
contention. (333 U.S. 841 [68 St.Ct. 656, 92 L.Ed. 1125].) In 
granting certiorari, the court did not decide, as petitioner 
concludes, that the Fourteenth Amendment would be violated 
by a conclusive administrative adjudication that his sanity 
had been restored. It agreed merely to consider the question, 
but found it unnecessary to decide it because of the deputy 
attorney general's statement that under California procedure 
a judicial remedy was available to petitioner. Mr. Justice 
Black, speaking for the majority, stated: "It is not appro-
priate for us to pass on such constitutional questions in this 
habeas corpus case if . . . there is a state remedy by man-
damus available to petitioner under which he can invoke 
judicial action to compel the warden to initiate judicial pro-
ceedings, and in which mandamus proceedings the court will 
hear and consider evidence to determine whether there is 
'reason to believe' that the petitioner is insane." (PhyZe v. 
Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ct. 1131, 1135, 92 L.Ed. 1494].) 
This eourt, however, did not limit itself in 1. re PhyZe, 
supra, to holding that habeas corpus was not the proper 
remedy, or even to holding that there could be no judieial 
review of the superintendent's determination. It held un-
equivocally that there eould be no judicial review under Cali-
) 
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fornia procedure and that petitioner's right to a judicial hear 
ing depended solely upon whether the warden believed th8. 
he was insane. (30 Cal.2d 838, 847 [186 P.2d 134].) The 
reasons for holding that there can be no judicial review ~. 
the superintendent's determination likewise preclude issuan~ 
of mandamus to compel action by the warden. The decisi~, 
of this court in Williams v. Dully, 82 Cal.2d 578 [197 P.2cl 
341], does not compel a contrary conclusion. In that ca8¢. 
the court, proceeding on the assumption· that mandamus w~, 
a proper remedy, held only that the petitioner therein did n··. 
present a sufficient case for the issuance of a peremptory wri 
Penal Code, section 3700, precludes the suspension of.~, 
execution of the judgment by mandamus just as it precludt! 
its suspension by habeas corpus. This statute prohibits 8.DJ: 
judicial intervention unless initiated by the warden of th~, 
state prison. In the absence of a holding by the United Sta 
Supreme Court that this statute is unconstitutional, I do not 
believe that this court should countenance the use of man;. 
damus to defeat its clearly stated purpose. :~ 
It bears emphasis that section 8700 presupposes a valid. 
judgment of death after a trial that has met all the requi~'; 
ments of due process of law. Then and only then is it opera-
tive; it would not be constitutional otherwise. It does not 
preclude attack upon the judgment itself by habeas corpus,"; 
coram nobis, or any other appropriate proceeding. In th~ 
present case there is no question of the validity of the judg-
ment. ':,. 
., 
Petitioner contends that the procedure the Legislature has. 
prescribed for determining his restoration to sanity would 
deprive him of his life without due process of law. Petitioner" 
is to be deprived of his life, not because an administrative, 
officer has found him sane, but because a jury has duly found .. 
him guilty of murder in the first degree. Petitioner does not 
claim to have been insane at the time he committed the offense' . 
or unable to assist in his own defense because of insanity at . 
the time of trial. He relies on the accidental intervention of " 
insanity after trial and conviction as a basis for a right under: .' 
the Fourteenth Amendment to have the execution of the judg-
ment suspended pending a forma] judicial determination, He 
contends that this right is so, ext~nsive tJ.1at th~ state is pow~r- ·.1·· .. 
less to leave the final determmation of hIS samty to an admin- .' 
istrative officer. 'j 
Taking refuge in insanity as a means of escaping execution 1 
is not a cOnstitutional right, but a privilege that the state has I 
, 
I 
) 
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conferred as an act of mercy or special dispensation. All the 
United States Supreme Court stated in Nobles v. Georg1a, 
168 U.S. 398,407 [18 S.Ct.. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515]: "The plea at 
this stage is only an appeal to the humanity of the court to 
postpone the punishment until recovery takes place, or as a 
merciful dispensation. The rights of the prisoner as an of-
fender on trial for an offense are not involved. He has had 
the benefit of a jury trial, and it is now the court, only, which 
must be satisfied on the score of humanity." (Accord: People 
v. Knott, 122 Cal. 410 [55 P. 154] j Spann v. 8tate. 47 Ga. 
649 j Davidson v. Commonwealth, 174 Ky. 789 [192 S.W. 846]; 
Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa.St.200 j 8tate ex reI. Al/ani v. 
8uperior Court, 139 Wash. 125 [245 P. 929].) Recognizing 
that the suspension of execution on the ground of intervening 
insanity is a privilege granted by the state, and not a funda-
mental right of the defendant, at least 15 states- bavp dis-
pensed with a formal judicial hearing upon the issue; others 
have provided merely for an informal inquiry that need 
satisfy only the trial judge of the defendant's sanity. Georgia, 
whose summary procedure was upheld in Nobles v. Georgia, 
lUpt'a, 168 U.S. 398, has repealed the statutes there questioned, 
and now provides no method by which the claim of intervening 
insanity may be raised. (Cnob v. Parker, 119 Ga. 29R 146 
S.E.llO].) Even in states in which the determination is made 
by the trial judge, the proceeding is not regarded as judicial 
in nature. "The appointment of the commission and the in-
vestigation made by them was not deemed or intended to be 
a trial in any sense of the word. It was simply, in our judg-
ment, the proper exercise of a discretionary power." (8tate 
v. Nordstrom, 21 Wash. 403, 409 [58P. 248].) It has been 
held proper for the state to make the decision of the initia1 
arbiter final, expressly precluding any judicial review thpreof. 
(Webber v. Commonwealth, 119 Pa.St. 223 [13 A. 4271 ; Dar-
nell v. 8tate, (Tex.Cr.) 5 S.W. 522 j State v. Nordstrom. 21 
Wash. 403 [58 P. 248] ; see cases collected in 49 A.L.R. ~04,) 
There has been wide recognition of the value of de)egatinll 
decisions of this kind t.o administrative expertR The Briti",h 
Criminal Lunatics Act, for example, providp~ (47 and 48 Vir.t .. 
ch. 64) that a person u ••. ceases to be a I'riminal hmatic 
(1) if he is remitted to prison by a warrant of the RpC'rPtary 
• Arizona, CaliforniR, T dnho. MissiAlIippi. Mi".Ol1r1. Montnnn. Nf'h"A~ka. 
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Virrinia, 
"',ominr. 
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of State issued upon a certificate from two medical pract1 
tioners that he is sane .... " (26 Halsbury's Laws of Eng~ 
land 207.) The official draft of the proposed Code of Criminal 
Procedure of the American Law Institute makes provisioD 
(§§ 409.12) for a procedure similar to that estabHshedby. 
the Penal Code. Section 412 of the American Law Institute' 
Code provides for the commitment to an institution of a 
person under sentence of death who has been found to ~ 
insane. It then provides that" [I]f thereafter the proper 
officer of such institution is of the opinion that the defendant 
is sane he shall report this fact to the governor, whereupon 
the governor shall appoint a commission consisting of two 
competent disinterested physicians to determine whether the' 
defendant has been restored to sanity .... If, after the' 
report of the commission, the governor decides that the de-
fendant has been restored to sanity, he ahall cause the defend-
ant to be returned to the custody of the -- (officer in charge 
of the prison to which the defendant has been committed) 
and shall issue a warrant to the --- directing him to 
execute the sentence at a time designated in such warrant." 
(Amer. Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure, § 412.) 
Under none of these provisions has it been deemed necessary 
or desirable that the defendant be accorded a judicial hearing 
or that his" right to insanity" be safeguarded against ex parte 
determination by appropriate administrative officials. (See, 
also, People v. Sloper, 198 Cal. 601 [246 P. 802]; People v. 
Eldred, 103 Colo. 334 [86 P.2d 248]; Bingkam v. State, 82 
Okla.Cr. 305 [169 P.2d 311] ; State v. Nordstrom, 21 Wash. 
403 [58 P. 248].) 
The reason ordinarily advanced against executing a man 
who has become insane since judgment is that he might, if 
sane, recall something in stay of execution. (See 4 Blackstone, 
Commentaries (Jones ed.), p. 25.) Can this reason serve as 
a basis for a constitutional right not to be executed while 
insane' The possibility that a defendant, sane at the time of 
his trial, will recall some fact in stay of execution after a 
period of intervening insanity is remote. The reasoning that 
would establish a constitutional right to delay on this basis 
would also serve to postpone the execution of a sane man on 
the ground that a witness IQight conceivably be discovered 
thereafter whose testimony might save him. If the possibility 
of a subsequently refreshed memory were enough to prevent 
the execution of an insane man, it would also render uncon-
stitutional any capital punishment, since it is possible to 
Aug. 1949] PHYLE tJ. DuFFY 
[M C.2d 144: 208 P.2d 868] 
159 
speculate endlessly about the possibilities that would rescue 
a condemned man from execution provided it were delayt>d 
long enough. 
Those who would delay capital punishment by questioning 
the finality of an administrative determination of sanity may 
in reality be concernE'd with the finality of capital punishment 
itself. Is it not an inverted humanitarianism that deplores 
as barbarous the capital punishment of those who have become 
insane after trial and conviction, but accepts the capital 
punishment of sane men, a curious reasoning that would free 
a man from capital punishment only if be is not in full posses-
sion of his senses' 
Petitioner can claim at most a privilege, not a constitutional 
right. The Legislature bas qualified this privilege by the con-
dition that the administrative determination of sanity is not 
subject to judicial review; it has done so to prevent abuses 
of the privilege to secure delay. It is now contended, however, 
that the Legislature cannot thus qualify the privilege it bas 
granted; that when the determination of the fact is a matter 
of life or death, it cannot be left to the ex parte unreviewable 
decision of an administrative officer. 
The misleading implication is that petitioner is condemned 
by an administrative determination of his sanity. His lift' was 
forfeit when a jury found him guilty of first degree murdE'r. 
His temporary release from punishment was a reprieve, not 
an absolution. His plea is now but to the mercy of the state. 
The Legislature can properly leave to an administrative 
officer the final determination as to whether a condition (,Dsta 
that justifies extending a privilege. (United States ere reI. 
Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 [69 S.Ct.921, 93 
L.Ed. -]; St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 
U.S. 38, 77 [56 8.Ot. 720, 80 L.Ed. 10331 : Dismuke v. United 
States, 297 U.S. 167, 171-172 f56 S.Ct. 400, 80 L.Ed. 561]; 
Work v. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 182 [45 S.Ct. 252, 69 L.Ed. 561]; 
United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 [39 S.Ct. 464, 63 
L.Ed. 1011] ; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 261-262 
{25 8.Ot; 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040]; Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 
F.2d 239, 243-244; United States ere rel. Medeiros v. Watkins, 
166 F.2d 897, 899; United States ere reZ. Lapides v. Watkins, 
165 F.2d 1017.) When there is merely a question of the regu-
lation of a privilege, the validity of final administrative deci-
sions under the due process clause does not require that notice 
or hearing be given. (Oceanic Steam Na1). Co. v. Stranaha-n, 
/ 
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214 U.S. 320-338 [29 S.Ot. 671, 53 L.Ed. 1013]; Perkins -v., 
Lukens Steel 00.,310 U.S. 113 [60 S.Ot. 869,84 L.Ed. 110S-U 
Origet v. Hedden, 155 U.S. 228 [15 S.Ct. 92,39 L.Ed. 130)'; 
Passavant & 00. v. United States, 148 U.S. 214 [13 S.Ot. 5;2, 
87 L.Ed. 426] ; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. (U.S.) 497 110 
L.Ed. 559]; United States v. Ju T01J, 198 U.S. 253, 261-262 
[25 S.Ct. 644,49 L.Ed. 1040].); 
The present case is analogous to those involving indeter-; 
minate sentence laws that give administrative agencies exclu-: 
sive power to reduce the maximum sentences imposed by law.' 
Upon conviction the defendant forfeits his liberty for th,e 
maximum term specified by statute. Thereafter the apprO::, 
priate administrative body may reduce the sentence if it sees 
fit. These statutes, which allow the defendant 'sliberty to turn 
on the ex parte unreviewable decision of administrative ofli-' 
cers, have been uniformly upheld on the ground that they" 
violate no provision of the United States Constitution. (Ugh-" 
banks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 [28 S.Ct. 372, 52 L.Ed. 
582]; Dreyer v. 1Ui~ois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 [23 S.Ct. 28, 47 j 
L.Ed 79]; United States v. Ragen, 159 F.2d 356, cert. den. 
331 U.S. 823 [67 S.Ot. 1311, 91 L.Ed. 1839] ; People v. Oon-
nors, 291 Ill. 614 [126 N.E. 595], d'd, 260 U.S. 695 [43 
S.Ot. 11, 67 L.Ed. 468] ; see also In re Byrnes, 32 Oal.2d 843, 
850 [198 P.2d 685].) Otherwise it would be unconstitutional 
to give to the governor of the state the power to commute , 
sentences. Here again the question of life or death turns OD 
the unreviewable decision of a single nonjudicial oflicer; yet' 
it has never been suggested that his decisions are subject to 
judicial review. Executive clemency is recognized as an act 
of mercy. Granting of the privilege of not being executed to 
one who is insane is likewise an act of mercy. Considerations ' 
may be presented to the governor for stay of execution or com-
mutation of sentence that constitute much stronger grounds 
for mercy than intervening insanity; there may be strong 
doubts as to defendant's very guilt, or mitigating circum-
stances that do not warrant judicial intervention but carry a 
strong appeal to executive clemency. Yet the governor's deter-
mination is 1inal even though it maybe adverse to the peti-
tioner. It follows that unless the Constitution itself prohibits 
the executioD of a man who has become insane since judgment, 
the Legislature may well leave to the warden the final deter-
mination as to whether there is reason to believe he is insane. 
The procedure provided by sections 3700-3704 of tb{' Penal 
Code to determine when execution shall be stayed because of 
) 
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defendant's intervening insanity is closely akin to that ap· 
proved by the United States Supreme Court in Nobles v. 
Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 [18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515]. Under 
that procedure also the determination of whether there was 
reason to believe defendant insane was left to the ex parte 
determination of a single state officer. and there was no bear. 
ing on the question. The court held that due process did not 
require the granting of a bearing on this issue when a state 
judge had determined after an ex parte examination of the 
defendant that there was no reason to believe that defendant 
was insane. It has been suggested that the Georgia procedure 
was sustained because a judge ruled· on the question of fact. 
As at common law, the person given the discretionary author· 
ity was the trial judge, but it is clear, however, that he acted 
much in the manner of an administrative official or board. 
"It is rather a perversion of terms to call an inquisition of 
this kind the act of a court and to exercise in reference to it 
the writ of certiorari. The whole proceeding is rather an 
inquiry based on public propriety and decency, than a mattE'r 
of right .•.. " (Spann v. 8tate, 47 Ga. 549, 551. See, also, 
Baughn v. State, 100 Ga. 554 [28 S.E. 68, 38 L.R.A. 577], 
d'd in Nobles v. Georgia, and Car,. v. State, 98 Ga. 89 [27 
S.E. 148], holding that under the law of Georgia the decision 
was not appealable.) It is settled, moreover, that the doctrine 
of separation of powers under the United States Constitution, 
which requires that certain issues of law or fact be decided 
by the judicial branch in the federal government, has no 
application to the states. (Cla1oorne County v. Brooks, 111 
U.S. 400, 410 [48 S.Ot. 489, 28 L.Ed. 470] ; Carler v. Caldwell, 
200 U.S. 293, 297 [26 S.Ct. 264, 50 L.Ed. 488] ; Consolidated 
Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 552 [28 S.Ct. 178, 
52 L.Ed. 827] ; Reetz v.Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 507 [23 S.Ct. 
890, 47 L.Ed. 563]; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 [23 
S.Ct. 28, 47 L.Ed. 79].) There is nothing in the United 
States Constitution requiring states to delegate to one branch 
rather than another the decision on a question of fact. If due 
process requires notice and hearing, those requirements must 
be met whether the question is to be decided by a judge or 
an administrative officer. (Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375, 
878 [58 S.Ct. 273, 82 L.Ed. 312]; Gellert v. National City 
Bank 01 New York, 313 U.S. 221. 235 r61 S.Ct. 898. 85 L.Ed. 
l299, 133 A.L.R. 1467].) If due process does not require 
,,~ 
/ 
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notice and hearing, it is immaterial whether the ex p8r~ 
determination is made by a judge or a nonjudicial offic{'r ~i:. 
the government. Accordingly, the approval of the ex part:' 
determination of a judge in the Nobles case by the {Tnil.·' 
States Supreme Court would seem to be directed at the vali(l 
ity of the determination itself, not at the fact that it w 
made by a judge. t. 
Petitioner had the benefit of independent determinations n 
his sanity by the hospital superintendent and by the warden 
The Legislature is entitled to rely upon a presumption tha 
these administrative and executive officers will act honest 
and in good faith. There is no reason to believe that a jud 
could do more. ('~: 
Petitioner contends, however, that since his insanity w' 
initially determined by a jury in a judicial hearing, that adju 
dication gave him a vested right to be considered insane 
He contends that either the judgment should continue in for 
or there should be proceedings in a court of competent j . 
diction to annul it or to supersede it with one of equal an 
later authority. This contention attributes to that adjudica 
tion a conclusiveness that it does not have. The judgment di 
not give petitioner a continuing status of insanity that 
only be terminated after another judicia] hearing. (Kellog 
v. Cochran, 87 Cal. 192, 198 {25 P. 677, 12 L.R.A. 1041 
United States v. Halliday, 116 F.2d 812; In re Kassler, 17 
Misc. 856 [19 N.Y.S.2d 266] ; Sutton v. Sutton, 222 N.C. 27 . 
[22 S.E.2d 553J; Bishop v. Bishop, 40 Ohio App. 493 [17 
N.E. 142J.) The order of commitment stated only that th 
petitioner was then insane, and, pursuant to Penal Cod . 
section 3704, provided expressly "when said William JeroID. 
Phyle recovers his reason, that the Superintendent of th j 
State Hospital in which he is confined certify that fact to the 
Governor of the State of California for further proceedin~ 
as is required by law." The order by its terms recognizes tha~ 
petitioner was to be confined in the hospital only until the 
superintendent certified that he had recovered his rt'asorJ 
When that certification is made, the order of commitment 
and the judgment of insanity no longer bar bis recommitmen~ 
to prison. When a statute such as section 3704 provides that: 
the authorities of an institution shall discharge an inmate: 
upon their determination that he is sane, such a discharge: 
restores the person to a status of sanity. (Kellogg v. Cochran, 
87 Cal. 192, 198 [25 P. 677, 12 L.R.A. 1041: Shaw v. Peehan, 
207 Cal. 561 [279 P. 658] ; People ex rel. Guiseppi v. Tka1l"'~, 
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242 N.Y.S. 293; State ex ret. Connur v. Lanmeck, 133 Ohio St. 
257 ~13 N.E.2d 127 J ; see Smoot, Law of Insanity, § 168, p. 128 
and American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure, 
§ 412.) The hospital superintendent acted pursuant to the 
statute and the order of commitment; 1t cannot reasonably 
be held that this order precluded his making the determination 
it prescribed. 
This court is here concerned, not with the wisdom of capital 
punishment or of the statutory procedure attendant upon it, 
but solely with the validity of that procedure. I t may never-
theless be noted that there is sound reason underlying Penal 
Code, section 3700, so long as capital punishment is author-
ized in this state. If a defendant condemned to death under 
a valid judgment is allowed recourse to the courts as a matter 
of right upon his claim to be insane, he may secure an inter-
minable reprieve merely by alleging that he is insane. Even 
after he is adjudged sane following hearing and appeal, he 
can allege that he has since become insane. Since the issue 
is his present insanity. he can thus set in motion an endless 
procession from trial to appeal tQ trial to appeal. Such pro-
cedure "would make the punishment of a defendant 'depend 
solely upon his fecundity in making suggestion after sugges-
tion of insanity, to be followed by trial upon trial'." (Phyle 
v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 [68 S.Ct. 1131, 1134, 92 L.Ed. 1494].) 
If the warden's decision is subject to judicial review, the way 
is open for the endless series of trials and appeals that the 
Legislature sought to prevent by the enactment of section 3700. 
Even if it is assumed that mandamus will lie to review the 
warden's determination, the peremptory writ was properly 
denied in this ease. Petitioner was in fact, although erro-
neously, accorded a full judicial hearing on the question 
whether there was reason to believe that he was then insane. 
As the opinion of Mr. Justice Edmonds sets forth, not only 
was there ample evidence to support the judgment, but peti-
tioner presented no evidence that might even serve as a basis 
for a contrary conclusion. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., concurring and dissenting.-Now th(' (,Tror 
of this court in holding (In re Phyle (1947), 30 Cal.2rl 8:i8 
[186 P.2d 134] ) that habt'as corpus was not a\'ailable as against 
the ruling of an administrative agent to tPRt th(' sanity of a 
person under sentence of death, starts to multiply. Its progeny 
) 
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is a new ,rial courtprocedttre (and, originating in a trial 
court, it carries a right of appeal) whereby the convicted one 
may invoke mandamus, repeatedly and apparently as often 
as Gee·asion may arise, to try to compel the warden to exercise 
discretion to require the district attorney to file proceedings, 
in the trial court, impanel a jury and try anew the question 
of the defendant's sanity. All this, notwithstanding that the 
warden has already once so acted, that a trial has been had, 
• judgment rendered and that the sole question properly to 
be raised, within the requirements of due process, is whether. 
the original judgment of insanity still is operative. It is still 
operative if the defendant remains insane and gives him all-
the protection which a new trial and judgment could give him; 
but if defendant has recovered his sanity the judgment by 
its own terms has expired and defendant should be executed. 
As is hereinafter shown habeas corpus is traditionally, and 
by earlier decisions of this court, the sole and exclusive remedy 
to settle the single issue. , 
In the opinion prepared by Justice Edmonds it is said that 
"Where a prisoner seeks to invoke the statutory remedy pro-
vided by section 3701 of the Penal Code, mandate is the only 
available proceeding. Thus, upon the assumption that any 
judicial bearing as to sanity must be afforded one under sen-
tence of death, there are two remedies, each directed to an 
exclusive form of relief. To acquire a simple judicial deter-
mination of the fact of sanity, habeas corpus is the proper , 
and exclusive remedy. But to obtain a jury trial of that issue, 
as provided by section 370] of the Penal Code, mandate is the 
only available and adequate remedy." And that proposition 
is said to apply here even though defendant has already had 
the trial as provided for· by section 3701. Anyone judgment" 
in such a case is said to have no continuing eBect because it . 
relates only to sanity as or its date and to be immaterial in-
respect to the claim as of a later date; hence, regardless of 
the outcome of a first sanity trial under sections 370] et 
sequitl'lr th(' defendant as of a later date may invoke man-
damus seeking to compel another trial on the same issue and 
to the same end. Such a procedure bids fair to be a most 
useful one for those who would seek unwarranted delays in 
the execution of death sentences. 
Because of the deplorably confused state in which several 
important bl'an~hf'R of thf' law (habeas corpus, mandamus, 
coram nobis, due process, suspension of the death penalty, con-
I 
.-) 
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mct of laws, trial for insanity of a condemned person, com-
parative powers of administrative agents and courts, etc.) are 
left by the present opinion (or lack of one in which a majority 
of the court agree), read in conjunction with the majority 
opinion of this court in 1", 1'6 Phy" (1947), nIWo, 80 Cal.2d 
838, and the opinions of the justices of the United States 
Supreme Court in Phyu v. Duffy (1948), 834 U.S. 431 (68 
S.Ct. 1131, 92 L.Ed. 1494], one who would seek to follow 
the vagaries of the law through the inconsistencies of tbiI 
ease, with the object of rescuing as much as poasible of ita 
integrity, should both concur and dissent. 
I should concur in the judgment denying relief in this pro-
~eding because: 1. mandamus is not a proper remedy i 2. the 
relief sought by mandamus has already been accorded the 
petitioner and a valid judgment determining the very issues 
sought to be litigated is. presently outstanding;1 8. there is 
available (and at all times concerned there has been) the plain, 
direct and simple remedy of habeas corpus, expressly provided 
by statute to try the only issues which can properly now be 
raised (Pen. Code, §§ 1473, 1487(5), 1493). But I shOlild 
dissent from the judgment beeause,if the novel soggestion 
that habeas corpus is not the proper or the exclusive l'emedy 
to try the legality of one'. imprisonment after sentence (par-
ticularly the identity of his jailer, Pen. Code, §1487(5» is 
to be followed, as the opinion of Justice Edmonds suggests, 
and if mandamus is to be sobstituted for habeas corpus or 
added as an additional remedy (not to directly determine 
the legality of the place of detention or identity of the cus-
todian but to compel a third person administrator to exercise 
discretion to initiate proceedings to cause a district attorney 
to start proceedings in a trial court to try anew before a 
jury as of a new date the question of petitioner's sanity), then 
it must follow, if we accord any weight at all to the earlier 
verdict of the jury and outstanding judgment of the soperior 
court, that as a matter of law there is shown "good reason to 
believe that a defendant, under judgment of death, has become 
1rfhia ill true unI888 we are to hold that the mere puaage of time 
alte,. the iaaues and conaequent!y entitles .. condemned person to repeated 
trials in a trial court on the l&IIle iaaues as of .-ell new date he ma;y eelect; 
or, if the warden or district attorney neglect to nggeat or institute neb 
trials then, b7 the majority opinion, the condemned person, apparen~ 
as often 8.8 he may ask, is entitled to a trial-1" the tMl courl-"labeled 
mandamua," and, if the judgment be advene, to _ app-.l fnm . aU 
ruliDa. 
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insane" (Pen. Code, § 3701) and the duty of the warden' 
would appear to require the reinitiation of the roundabout' 
and cumbersome procedures above mentioned.·i,~ 
A brief statement of the facts is here pertinent. On Feb-· 
ruary 20, 1946, William Jerome Phyle was convicted of the' 
crime of murder of the first degree and sentenced to death'. 
The judgment of conviction was affirmed (People v. Phllle 
(1946),28 Ca1.2d 671 [171 P.2d 428]). In December of that 
year, in a proceeding duly instituted by the district attorney., 
at the suggestion of the warden of San Quentin Prison under" 
the provisions of section 3701 of the Penal Code, a jury found' 
that Phyle was insane. Our statute prohibits execution of the 
insane (Pen. Code, § 1367). The judgment of the superior 
court, following the verdict, determined that Phyle was then 
insane and adjudged that he be confined in the state hospital 
for the insane "until his reason be restored." Twenty-five 
days later (18 days after Phyle's admission to the hospital) 
the superintendent of the hospital, without trial or hearing, 
without judicial determination that Phyle had become sane, 
and without any determination upon any prescribed or ascer-
tainable standard, certified to the governor that Phyle had 
recovered his sanity and he was returned to the warden of 
the prison for execution. That is to say, the place of Phyle'. 
confinement and the identity of his jailer were changed; he , 
was transferred from the custody of the superintendent of 
the 'state hospital for the criminal insane to the custody of 
the warden of a state prison. If, in truth, Phyle continued 
to be insane the judgment of the court required that he be ' 
kept in the hospital; as long as he remained insane the judg-
meni remained effective and his imprisonment in any institu-
tion other than the state hospital or by any custodian other 
than the hospital superintendent would be unlawful. Phyle 
contended that the transfer was unlawful, that his detention 
by the warden was unlawful, and that the superintendent of 
the hospital remained his lawful custodian. He sought relief 
by application for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging the facts 
as to the jury trial, the rendition of judgment and his commit-
ment to the hospital. Phllle alleged, and it U/a8 not denied by 
the State, that in truth" said PkllZewa8, and still is, insane." 
Nevertheless, the majority of this court held that the ruling 
of the sole administrative agent (the hospital superintendent), 
even though arrived at by no fixed or ascertainable standard, 
was supreme; that his ruling, regardless of lack of standard, 
) 
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completely and irrevocably terminated the judgment of the 
court; that Phyle must be executed on the agent's ruling; and 
that neither this court nor any other had jurisdiction to review 
the administrative order. (In re Phyle (1947), ,upra,30 Cal. 
2d 838;) Thereafter the United States Supreme Court issued 
certiorari but on the hearing accepted a statement of the 
Attorney General of California to the effect that this court 
did not rule that Phyle was entitled to no judicial review of 
the administrative agent's order, but held only that habeas 
corpus was the wrong remedy and that a procedure "labeled 
mandamus" was the proper, and an available, remedy (whe~ 
ther to review the agent's order or to again try, as of a new 
date, the issue of Phyle's sanity, is not entirely dear) and 
upon that novel theory dismissed the certiorari proceeding. 
(Phyle v. Duffy (1948), aupra, 334 U.S. 431.) 
That the attorney general was mistaken in his representa-
tion,at least insofar as the intention of this court is concerned, 
is known to all of us and is apparent from the language used 
by the majority. They declared that (In rePhyle (1947), 
supra, 30 Cal.2d 838, 840-8(1) "The only question presented 
is whether a person who has been adjudged insane after eon-
viction, sentence, and delivery to a warden of a state prison 
for execution, has the right toa judicial determination of the 
question of his restoration to sanity.. . .• [pp. 842-843] 
There is no authority . . . for the proposition that defendant 
has a right to habeas corpus or other jtulicial proceeding to 
determine the question of his sanity after his release from the 
state hospital. In fact, section 3700 of the Penal Code eJ:~ 
pressly prohibits· such a proceeding." (Italics added.) Mak-
ing their position still more clear, they continued" [po 845] 
Where there isa statute that declares that the superintendent 
of the state hospital where the prisoner iseon1ined may 
'A reading of the ltatute (Pen. Code, .8100) diBe10eea that it dGel! 
aot "expr88B1y prohibit [ 1" UI.7 neb proceeding. The eontext of the 
ltatement nggests that it Mould be understood as Gf'ptMI&tK'" GIl 
ouctoritotem FoestO,,"'" j it argues that eince the court itself may Dot 
(it &BIumes or declares .. a premise) IUBpend ezeeutioD iD UI.7 ease but 
on appeal, then the power and jurisdiction to review iD UI.7 ease but em 
appeal are to be UJlderstood .. ,,,,pliedl)' prohibited. In other words thiB 
argument, sweeping aside without comment all coDBtitutional couidera· 
tionB of due process (see People v. 8hOf1, (1948), 82 CaL2d 502, 1506 
[191 P.2d 330]; JlOtm6)' v. BoZohGA (1935), 294 U.s. 103, 110 [55 
S.Ct. 840, 79 L.Ed. 191, 98 A.L.R. 406]; To)'wr v. Alabama (1948), 
aa5 U.S. 252 [68 B.Ot. 1415, 92 L.Ed. 1935]) would completely abolish 
habeas corpus, OOf'O'" aob .. , and all other judicial remedies iD aeath 
penalty eaaes, acept appeals from the judgment of eoa'rietiOL 
I 
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declare the prisoner's sanity restored, I a pel'Sl)n awaiting ~­
ecution has no right to a [po 846J judicial determination of 
his restoration to sanity'. . . By adopting section 3700 of the 
Penal Code prohibiting the courts from suspending the execu~ 
tion of judgment of death except on appeal, the LegislatuN 
has provided in effect that the courts of this state are without 
power [regardleas of constitutional provisionsl, except as pro-. 
vided by statute, to determine the 88llity of a person who bu 
been sentenced to be executed for a capital offense and is m. 
the custody of the warden . . . for the purpose of executi~ 
•. . Thus. regardleas of what the common law powers of ,.a; 
court may be, when the procedure for the determination ~f 
the question of sanity of a person who has been sentenced to 
death is covered by statute, a court has no inherent power to· 
determine that question and such a person has no right to • 
judicial determination of the question unless the statutes 10 
provide .•. 1p. 847J The question remains whether the 
statutory procedure [as interpreted by the majority] for d.: 
termining the question of restoration to sanity is constitu-
tional. Petitioner contends that defendant has a right to an 
adjudication of the question of his sanity, protected by the 
due proceas ('lauses of the Constitution of the United States 
and the Constitution of California. There it flO ncA rigA' 
.nder either Oonstitution (italics added] ••• 
"[p.849] The petitioner contends also that the separation 
of powers provision of section 1 of article III of the California 
Constitution is violated by leaving the final determination of 
• prisoner's sanity to administrative officers ••• [po 850] 
Even if it be assumed that the power of the superintendent 
of the state hospital. to whom defendant was delivered, to 
determine whether defendant bas recovered his reason is • 
judicial power, the foregoing provisions of the California Con-
stitution authorize the delegation of this power. Under the 
statutes the prisoner is delivered to the custody of the super-
intendent as a person convicted of a felony. and thereafter, 
10 far aathe superintendent '8 authority over such a person 
is concerned the superintendent exercises not only the author-
ity of an officer entrusted with the superintendence of an 
-oar ltatute purports onlJ to authorize the lIlJIerintendent to declare 
the fact when it haa been ill aome way 1)revioualy ueenailled and deter-
JDiDed; certaiDly it does Dot expresaly, and there ia at least grave doubt 
that it does impliedlJ, authorize the Illperintendent to himself determine 
the fact; nol' dOO8 it establish any standard by whieb the determillatioD i 
IIhall be made b7 lOut or layman. (See Pea. Oocle, It 8701-1704.) 
I 
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institution for convicted felons but the duties and fnnctiona 
prescribed in Penal Code, section 8704. 
"It follows that unless the warden of the prison in which 
defendant is incarcerated believes that defendant is now in-
sane, no court of this state baa jurisdiction to determine the 
question of his sanity." 
That the above quoted views and holdings of this court are 
irreconcilably inconsistent with the indicated views of the 
Supreme Court of the United States is apparent from a read-
ing of Pky~ v. Dvff" (1948), "'pro, 884 U.S. a1 [68 S.Ot. 
1181, 92 L.Ed. 1494]. Such quoted views are Jikewise, II 
pointed out in my dissent in In r. Pk,,~ (1947), "'prG, 80 
CaL2d 838, 854, et seq., squarely contrary to the earlier hold-
ings of this court in Gardner v. JOftU (1899), 126 CaL 614, 
615-616 [69 P. 126], and I .. r. BuckoMfl (1900), 129 Cal. 
880, 332-833 [61 P. 1120, 60 L.R.A. 878], with which earlier 
cases the views of the UDited States Supreme Court appear 
to be in full accord. 
The irreconcilable dUference between the United States Su-
preme Court and our majority is pointed up forcefully by 
:Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in PAyle v. Dvffy, "'prG 
(pp.",-"5 of 884: U.s.): "The court now finds that aU tkat 
Ike Califomia 8upr.fM Court did toG8 to hold lkat os G matter 
of California procedure [italics added] the petitioner'. claim 
could not be passed on by the direct remedy of habeas eorpua, 
but that there is available a special local remedy, labeled 
mandamua, whereby the petitioner can judicially test hia 
present sanity • • • Whatever may be the elegancies of pro-
cedure by which the matter is to be determined, our ~ 
declinintl to crmrider tlu tlrotl. comtitutionol UItUl tokick w. 
tkougkt to. had before .. , " contingent upon 41 determiMtiots 
b" tke 8upr.fM Court of California tkat tlu low of lkot .tat. 
is wkat our d6ciBirm ""'""ppo.,, " to b. [italics added], 
namely, that CaliforDia by a remedy which California chooses 
to call mandamus enables the present petitioner to secure a 
judicial determination of his present sanity. Tkis fMG'nS, of 
course, flOf fk. tI.ry r"tricted ,cope of relief tokick u ftOf'maU" 
associated tDitk Ik. Iraditional remed" of mafldamUl. [Italics 
added.] It presupposes that California atfords petitioner the 
means of challenging in a substantial way the 1% parle finding 
of the Superintendent of the State Hospital • • • and enables 
him to secUre judicial determination of the claims he has made 
in his petition for 1t.obeu corpUl, which, 80 the Court now 
.... ~...,....., ....... 
) 
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holds, is not the proper way to proceed." The majority iiJ 
this court now cite and rely on the above quoted proposition. 
yet every member of this court knows that no such idea waS 
considered or intended by this court in In re Phyle. This court 
did not deny habeas corpus on the· ground that simply". 
a matter of California procedure" mandamus was the proper 
-and exclusively the proper-remedy; quite differently, the 
majority denied habeas corpus solely and exclusively because 
they intended to hold that the power of the administrative 
agent was supreme and that petitioner; having been ruled on 
by the administrative agent, had no right· to any judicial 
review. The majority opinion, as already noted, expressly 
declares (pp. 840-841 of 30 Oal.2d), "The only question pre-
sented is whether a person who has been adjUdged insanc 
after conviction . . • has the right to a judicial determination 
of the question of his restoration to sanity." Since the ques-
tion stated was the only question which the majority consid-
ered to be properly before them it is not surprising that all 
the discussion in the opinion is directed to the end of support-
ing their declared conclusion that a person in the position i 
of defendant petitioner has no right whatsoever to any judicial i 
process. 
Certain it is that this court did not intend to rule that 
defendant petitioner did have a right to judicial review of 
the administrative agent's ruling and that, having such right, 
habeas corpus was an improper, and mandamus the only 
proper, remedy. 
That mandamus is not a proper vehicle here is apparent at 
once. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and "is to be 
resorted to only in cases where the usual and ordinary forms of 
remedy are insufficient to afford redress." (16 Cal.Jur. § 17, 
p.784.) Habeas corpus is the usual and ordinary remedy for 
trying out the legality of the place of one's detention. Our 
Penal Code expressly provides for just such situations as that 
presented here: Section 1473 provides that "Every person 
unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any 
pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to 
inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint"; 
sections 1486, 1487(5) and 1493 provide that when a person 
is detained under court commitment but "When the person 
. having the custody of the prisoner is not the person allowed 
by law to detain him," the court shall exercise the writ and 
"order such party to be committf'd to the restraint or custody 
of such person as is by law entitled thereto." It is, and con-
I' 
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sistently has been since his adjudication of insanity, the posi-
tion of defendant petitioner that the superintendent of· the 
state hospitnl, not the warden of the prison, is entitled to his 
custody. That posiiion is correct 80 long as defendant remains 
legally insane and the judgment of the superior court per-
dures. Whether the final judgment of a court of record con-
tinues in effect is a question which a court, rather than a lay-
man, should, in the last analysis, determine. Likewise, if rights 
(to life or death or to property or liberty) depend on it, a 
person should certainly be entitled to have a judicial determi-
nation as to whether he is legally insane. Unless the court 
determines that fact neither the prisoner nor any court can 
know by what standard the fact has been determined. Our 
code provides no standard for determining legal insanity; our 
courts have set one up for their own proceedings but there is 
none prescribed for administrative agents. Even if we assume 
that the hospital superintendent has the power to make a 
prima facie or preliminary determination of restoration to 
legal sanity his determination must be subject to judicial 
review. That much seems clear from the United States 
Supreme Court's language in PhyZe v. Duffy and Ng Fung 
Ho v. White (1921),259 U.S. 276 [42 S.Ot. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938]. 
The obvious, the direct and the ordinary method for applying 
the judicial test in such cases is habeas corpus. 
The d1fficulty we are facing stems from the majority hold-
ing in In re PhyZe (1947), IUpra, 30 Cal.2d 838, joined with 
what appears to have been spur-of-the-moment adroitness of 
the attorney general in defending the majority opinion before 
the Supreme Court of the United States. The error of this 
court lay in holding that the ruling of the administrative 
agent (the medical superintendent of a hospital) terminating 
or superseding the judginent of a superior court was not sub-
ject to any judicial review in any court. The error of the 
attorney general, which was accepted and relied upon by 
the United States Supreme Court as thl' basis for its decision, 
lay in interpreting our majority decision not as denying the 
right to all judicial review but simply as denying habeas 
corpus as inappropriate, while suggesting mandamus as the 
appropriate, vehicle for review. But, as previously shown, our 
court made and intended no such holding. Every member of 
Our court knows that the majority intended to hold that the 
ruling of the administrativl' agent was not subject to any 
judicial review. If our court had intended a contrary holding 
,/ 
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-that the petitioner was entitled to a judicial review of the 
administrative agent's holding; i. e., to a judicial determina-" 
tion of the legality of his place of detention and the identity , 
of his jailer (see Pen. Code, §§ 1473, 1487 (5), 1493, IUp"a)-] 
think it is reasonably certain that at that time a majority if 
not all of the court would have held that habeas corpus was 
the proper remedy. I am sure that no member of the court, 
in making his decision, contemplated suggesting that the deci. 
sion should be 8ustained on the theory that it admitted of 
judicial review for the agent'8 ruling and that mandamus as 
eontradistinguished from habeas corpus was the proper vehicle 
for that review. 
Unless this court is to perpetuate and encourage error, con-
fusion, delays and cumbersome procedural griefs, both in this 
eourt and elsewhere, in the administration of criminal law in ' 
death penalty cases the correct and exclusive procedure in such 
cases as thie-habeas corp~ould be pointed out and 
adhered to rather than abandoned or augmented by anaddi-
tional trial court procedure. 
In the previous application for habeas corpus, the rendition 
and entry of the judgment, after trial by jury, determining 
petitioner to be insane were alleged and it was further averred 
and not denl6d that petitioner was &till (as of that date) insane. 
Unless the so-called ruling of the administrative agent that 
petitioner had been restored to sanity is, as was then held by 
the majority, entirely beyond judicial reach, then habeas 
eorpus was and still is the proper, the plain, the direct, and 
the exclusive remedy. Until, 1n re Ph"Ze that had been the 
law since Kellogg v. Cochran (1890), 87 Cal. 192, 197 [25 
P. 677, 12 L.R.A.I04]. 
It is my view that under the circumstances shown here 
habeas corpus is the only proper and the moat desirable 
remedy. Petitioner has already had the remedy provided by 
sections 8701 and 8703 of the Penal Code. The warden did 
believe that petitioner was insane; he acted on that belief; 
the question of petitioner'.l8Ility was duly brought to trial 
before a jury; the jury found petitioner to be insane; judg-
ment 80 decreeing was duly entered; no motion for new trial 
was made and no appeal was taken; the judgment remains 
outstanding, fully valid and operative unless petitioner has 
recovered his sanity. Whether or not he has recovered his 
legal sanity is the decisive question. That is the fact question 
for judicial determination; upon that fact depends the legal 
question as to whether petitioner shall be in the custody of 
) 
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the superintendent of the hospital or that of the warden of 
the prison. Habeas corpus is the established, convenient, avail-
able and ordinary remedy to try out both the factual and legal 
issues. 
On the other hand, if the court is to gore itself on the other 
horn of its dilemma,then, as heretofore indicated, I think 
that the original insanity proceedings in themselves (all had 
"after ... (petitioner's] delivery to the warden for execu-
tion"), particularly in the light of the solemn judgment based 
on the jury's verdict, constitute, 88 a matter of law, 'c good 
reason to believe that a defendant . . • had become insane" 
"after his delivery to the warden for execution" and,hence, 
that if an administrative agent thereupon and thereafter 
assumes to differ with such judicial determination, one of two 
things should inevitably follow (at least if his ruling is chal-
lenged) : Either the judgment should be respected and upheld 
as against the administrative agent or proceedings should be 
had in a court of competent jurisdiction to set aside and annul 
the judgment or to supersede it with one of at least equal and 
later authority-one which we can know is based on the same 
standard of legal insanity as was the one to be superseded. 
The judgment that had been entered decreed that petitioner 
was insane, committed him to the state hospital for the crim-
inal insane, and adjudged that he be tkere confined "until his 
reason be restored." The basic contention of petitioner is 
that his reason, by legal standards, has not in fact been 
restored. If in truth his reason, by such standards, has not 
been restored the judgment already rendered fully protects 
him against execution while insane; a new judgment to that 
effect can add nothing; the new one could be set aside as 
quickly as the old one; it would have no more prima facie or 
ultimate value than the old one. There is then no occasion for 
a new trial under section 3701 et sequitur. But if in truth and 
upon legal standards petitioner has recovered his reason, that 
fact can easily and promptly be ascertained and determined 
with legal finality in a habeas corpus proceeding. There is no 
occasion for inviting the uncertainty, circuity, appeals and 
other delays attendant upon the added trial court procedure 
here sought to be innovated. 
For the reasons stated it seems obvious that at this stage 
of the prosecution of Phyle and under the circumstances which 
have been enumerated, the application for mandamus is inap-
propriate. It is inappropriate because the remedy it seeks 
) 
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has already been accorded to Phyle; he has had the jury trial 
for which provision is made; he has been adjudged insane 
and the judgment still stands, as fully efficacious-if Phyle 
remains legally insane-as a new judgment under new pro-
ceedings could be. And the simplest and most direct vehIcle 
for determining whether he is still insane by the judicial stand~ 
ard, the only one which avoids appeal by the petitioner, and 
other indirection and causes of delay, is the ordinary one of 
habeas corpus. 
The total undesirability of following the newly suggested 
expedient of substituting mandamus for habeas corpus or of 
setting it up as an independent and additional procedure (as 
a method for review of proceedings after trial and judgment of 
insanity in proceedings pursuant to Penal Code, section 3701 
et sequitur) is emphasized by the consideration of what must 
follow if rationality and consistency are to obtain: If we 
assume that the remedy petitioner seeks here is a proper one, 
technically, notwithstanding the outstanding judgment, then 
it would seem to follow that surely such outstanding judgment 
must be accorded some weight, some prima facie significance; 
it should be considered as establishing, as a matter of law, 
that" good reason" exists for believing petitioner to be insane. 
General legal insanity, once adjudicated, is presumed to con~ 
tinue until the contrary is shown. (14 Oal.Jur. § 19, p. 363; 
28 Am.Jur. § 121, p. 751; Estate of Baker (1917), 176 Cal. 
430, 436 [168 P. 881].) The judgment, itself, constitutes 
"good reason" for believing Phyle to be insane. As empha-
sized in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court 
(p. 443 of 334 U.S.) it is not the belief of the warden nor the 
fact of insanity which must control the right to a jury trial 
of sanity if the procedure under section 3701 et sequitur be 
available. The court said: "In considering what the issues 
may be in a mandamus proceeding, it must be borne in mind 
that the warden is under a mandatory duty to initiate judicial 
proceedings. not when a defendant is insane, but when 'there 
i, good reason to believe' he is insane." (Italics are those of 
court.) And the "judicial proceedings" so made available 
are by the statute expressly and mandatorily made to encom-
pass a jury trial. •• rT]be court must at once cause to be sum-
moned and impaneled, from the regular jury list ... a jury 
of 12 persons to bear such inquiry." (Pen. Code, § 3701.) The 
duty of the warden tben would seem obvious: since "good 
reason" exists for the belief that petitioner is insane, the 
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warden has no power to tryout thc ultimate fact; that fact 
must be determined by a jury. If mandamus be available the 
warden, under the circumstances shown here, has no discre-
tion to do otherwise than again initiate the roundabout pro-
ceedings for another jury trial and judgment which could 
be, according to the majority, at once set aside by the hospital 
superintendent. But whether the warden initiates such special 
proceeding or not the petitioner, by this newly suggested pro-
cedure, is given a right to a hearing of lome kind i'll a triaZ 
court, and, since it is in a trial court, he has a right to appeal 
in the event of an adverse decision. On the other hand, if we 
adhere to the traditional and statutory remedy of habeas 
corpus the procedure is well defined and direct. It affords 
ample protection and expeditious procedure to both the con-
dtlmned and to the State. The protection of the state (and of 
the court) against groundlMS applications is simple; it is 
that which we use constantly in other applications of the writ. 
We require a prima facie showing of evidentiary facts and 
do not issue the writ on the bald allegation of a conclusion or 
ultimate fact. By way of example, when application for the 
writ is made on the ground of denial of due process in that the 
prosecution has introduced and relied upon perjured testi-
mony, with knowledge of its falsity. we require more than the 
conclusionary averment of the asserted ultimate fact; we 
require a specification of the evidence in detail and of the 
circumstances showing knowledge of its falsity by the prosecu-
tion. A similar prima facie specification of evidentiary matters 
should be required in applications for the writ under the cir-
cumstances shown here. 
The present case is not controlled by WiUiams v. Duffy 
(1948),82 Cal.2d 578 [197 P.2d 341]. In that case the ques-
tion of the sanity of the prisoner ~ndemned to death was 
raised for the first time by application for the writ of mandate. 
There was not there, as there has been here, a trial and an 
existing, at least prima facie valid, judicial determination that 
the prisoner was insane. Whether mandamus is, or is not, 
available as a remedy in an application of first instance as in 
the Williams case we need not here consider. 
For the reasons above stated I would affirm tile judgment 
solely on the ground that under the circumstances shown 
mandamus is an inappropriate. and habeas corpus is the only 
appropriatl'. remedy; but if the majority are to retroactively. 
as it were, adopt the suggestion of the attorney general and 
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the 88S1l.IDption of the United States Supreme Court, and now 
hold that mandamus is an appropriate remedy, whether exclu-
live or additional, then the judgment should be reversed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant'. petition for a rehearing was denied August 25, 
1949. Carter. J .• and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
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